Abstracts

Crisis Diplomacy

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It is not possible to identify one single and unifying definition of the term crisis diplomacy. A study of the functions and organization of diplomacy today results in three supplementary definitions of the term. Together they can provide us with a unique insight into the scope conditions of modern diplomacy and foreign services. Thus, crisis diplomacy can be defined as ‘diplomacy in crisis’, as ‘diplomatic crisis management’ and as ‘hardship diplomacy’. In this special issue all three definitions are being called upon.

Consular services and crisis diplomacy in the Danish Foreign Service – from minus to plus

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The Tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004 and the subsequent critical evaluation of the crisis response became a crucial turning point for the Danish Foreign Service. Prior to the Tsunami, the consular field was a relatively un-noticed part of the Foreign Service, in line with the classical description of the consular service as ‘the Cinderella service’. In the aftermath of the Tsunami, the Consular Services department of the Danish Foreign Service developed into an effective emergency response organization with a focus on crisis management, communication and robust external partnerships, as demonstrated by the successful evacuation of almost 6000 Danish nationals from Lebanon in July 2006. The experience from the Tsunami-operation suggests that classic bureaucracies are not particularly suited to handle an extensive consular crisis. That the evacuation from Lebanon two years later was a clear success is mainly attributable to the introduction by the Danish Foreign Ministry of organizational and managerial elements from the typical emergency response organization including extensive delegation of decision-making power to operational managers. This has since formed the basis for crisis management in the consular field and has become a part of a new organizational identity that broadens the public perception traditional understanding of the main tasks of the Danish Foreign Service. This de-
velopment has made Danish diplomacy more diverse.

**News media-logic and crisis diplomacy**

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Previous research in mass media and diplomacy has pointed in many different directions, but a shared point of interest has been trying to explore the link between news media coverage and public opinion in relation to important topics both domestic and international. Based on modern mediatization theory, this article focuses on how the political institutions of society are affected by the news media and their logic, and specifically how these developments affect two of the different types of crisis diplomacy that are the focus of this special issue: Crisis diplomacy understood as ‘diplomacy in crisis’ and crisis diplomacy, understood as ‘international crisis management’.

**Diplomacy and the Arab Spring**

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The Arab Spring in 2011 was only the beginning of a longer period of change in the Middle East and North Africa. The regimes are caught between massive challenges and reduced opportunities and without a major change of politics and policies, the region seems destined to continued political, economic and social stalemate with ensuing instability, increasing tensions and radicalisation as well as the risk of new revolutionary changes and regional power struggle. In this context, diplomats are required to handle a much broader field of tasks in a highly politicized context, to understand and act within a much broader field of interests and actors and to operate under more difficult working and security conditions in a highly unstable region.

**Diplomacy and the early conflict intervention**

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The aim is to give a sense of the reality facing diplomats in the early phases, when the international community decides to intervene in fragile states. The main focus is on Afghanistan immediately after the fall of the Taliban regime, but combined with lessons learned from especially Iraq and Libya as well. There are basic practical challenges when struggling to get operational. At a more strategic level the article examines, how the design of international operations is influenced by previous experiences and the amount of resources available – and what concrete dilemmas decision-makers are facing, often under significant time pressure. This includes reference to the so-called Brahimi-report from 2000 regarding future UN peace-keeping operations. It is important to learn from previous experiences, but one must reflect and respect the specific context in which decisions were made at the time. Denmark has gained significant experience from engagements in fragile states over the last decades, and the article highlights some of the particular Danish competencies, including civil-military cooperation, innovative aid approaches and early involvement of commercial actors.
Diplomacy behind barbed wires and in armoured vehicles. A case study from Afghanistan and Pakistan

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Today, Danish diplomats are being posted to hardship missions, where conditions are significantly different than on normal missions. Part of the daily work takes place behind barbed wire, concrete walls, in armoured vehicles, and surrounded by body guards. However, despite the differences in environment and working methods, the goal and the work itself is very similar to that of normal missions. Establishing a relevant network is key. The difficult environment forces hardship diplomats to be innovative and creative. Public Diplomacy – and especially social media – can be a shortcut to communicate with the local population, which one does not otherwise have access to. Support to Danish companies, which see significant commercial opportunities despite the challenges, is also taking up more time. The Danish Foreign Service has been forced to adapt to such new tasks. It has undergone a professionalization, and it has shown innovation and adaptability. For this reason, the Foreign Service is today better prepared to send diplomats out on hardship missions.

The United Nations: An organization with crisis management in its DNA

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The United Nations was created in 1945 as a collective security system in order to avoid a repetition of the horrors of the Second World War. Crisis management – preventing, solving and generally dealing with armed conflicts – is in its DNA and it has been fairly successful in doing so. In the 1950’s the Security Council developed peacekeeping missions to monitor peace agreements (Suez 1956). After the Cold War – and failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica – UN peace keeping has become much more robust and the mandates have expanded, linking up to peace building in fragile states. But ‘crisis management’ means more to the UN than armed conflicts. Climate Change, migration – partly due also to climate change – and pandemics like SARS or Ebola are growing risk factors which threaten to destabilize many countries over the coming decades. The UN plays a key role in preventing such increases in global crisis levels.

The Illusion of Nation Branding and Investment Promotion

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In this article it is argued that investment promotion agencies’ marketing efforts and nation branding activities do not influence international companies’ investment decisions. Rather, what matters for a company looking to make an investment abroad is a set of very specific investment factors: resource seeking, market seeking, non-marketable asset seeking and finally political framework conditions that influence the company’s incentive structure. It is therefore necessary to revise the way in which we see and understand the work of investment promotion agencies. From being primarily sales driven marketing organizations, they should instead focus their efforts on helping the company establish their business after they have made their investment decision. As such, their role should be that of a facilitator, and not of a country promoter, making the company’s way in to a new market as smooth as possible.