Abstracts

Detainess, international law and »the British Trick«
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The article examines why the handling of detainees has been such a sensitive political issue for the Danish Defence and Danish politicians throughout the military campaigns of the last decade, including the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. To that end, the article provides an overview of the relevant international legal framework for governing the detention of individuals in times of armed conflict as well as of the various creative initiatives that was implemented by the Danish government and the military forces in order to avoid accusations of violations of international law. Furthermore, the article explores why it has been – and continues to be – so important to the Danish politicians and the Danish Defence to make sure that no one can question the legality of the way it conducts war. The final part of the article contains some brief remarks on some of the implications of the increasing political emphasis on legality for, among others, lawyers within the civil service.

About British-Danish Military Cooperation and its Consequences
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After September 11, Great Britain has become Denmark’s primary military partner, and Danish military contributions to international operations has most often been anchored in a close and cooperative military and political British-Danish relationship. This article investigates that relationship and asks how Great Britain becomes Denmark’s primary partner. The answer is that cooperation develops more because of a range of discrete military, bureaucratic and political reasons than because of any long-term strategic aims. On that basis the article discusses the foreign policy consequences of the close relationship and concludes that cooperating with Great Britain often in itself turns into a priority in how Denmark participates in international operations. »Are the Brits in?« becomes an important question in deciding where, when and how Danish military power is used.
Which Lessons has the Danish Army Learned in Afghanistan?

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The Danish Army has always collected and used lessons learned, but in Afghanistan this process has been optimized. Lessons learned have resulted in a wide range of changes to doctrine and organization. Changes include a fundamentally different approach to operations in a full spectrum and complex environment with many different actors. New acquisitions have been affected by the lessons learned and existing equipment has been modified in a number of ways. The training of officers and soldiers at all levels has been adapted and targeted towards operations in a complex environment. Danish and British forces have worked extremely closely together. Key to a successful cooperation has been a common language, common tactics, techniques and procedures which are fundamental preconditions for avoiding misunderstandings and blue-on-blue incidents. Measurement of effect is difficult in a country with a large illiterate population. Consequently focus should be on visible rather than statistically significant results.

Denmark’s Approaches to Stabilisation Operations since 2004:
Towards the Comprehensive Approach

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Denmark’s comprehensive approach to stabilisation operations has been a central component in Danish contributions to international operations since 2004, not least in Afghanistan. A formal concept of comprehensive approach was introduced as part of the Defence Agreement for the period of 2005-2009, inspired by the situation in Iraq and the experiences of international partners. The Danish approach to stabilisation was further developed on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, and came to play a central role in the political negotiations over and control with the efforts in Afghanistan. The Afghan mission challenged actors to learn how to cooperate on the ground, but also prompted the emergence of an integrated model for stabilisation in Copenhagen where, from 2009 and onwards, a formal structure for stabilisation was consolidated. The publication of a new government stabilisation policy in 2013 marks a final shift from emphasis on post-conflict to conflict prevention.

When is it Over?
Why and How to Measure War Efforts

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In July 2013 the last Danish combat troops left Afghanistan, and onwards the Danish presence in Afghanistan will be limited to military instructors and development experts. However, how can one know that these efforts are the right ones right now? The article argues that the question can be answered through the use of performance measurements. Initially, the article argues that strategic debate among politicians should not cease with the first shot. Instead it should continue for the entire duration of a war. Strategic debate presupposes information from the battlefield, and performance measurements can supply this information. Building on the
Danish Afghanistan strategy, the Helmand plans, and the reporting on these, the article discusses how performance measurements can be used for future Danish military engagements. For this discussion the article makes use of historical examples and concepts from the literature on performance measurements. Lastly, the article presents four recommendations for the future.